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Abstract  
Product compatibility is becoming increasingly important especially in the IT industry due to a high 
level of network effect in this industry. This study empirically examines the business value of IT 
product compatibility initiatives with respect to the nature of the compatibility achieved (i.e., 
horizontal compatibility, vertical compatibility) and the type of focal product (i.e., software, 
hardware) for which compatibility is achieved. Using event study methodology, this paper investigates 
the market reaction to announcements of compatibility initiatives over a three-year period. The results 
show that business announcements associated with horizontal compatibility yield higher abnormal 
returns than the ones with vertical compatibility. Also compatibility initiatives for software products 
tend to be associated with a more positive stock market reaction than those for hardware products. 
Our findings reveal the nuances in IT product compatibilities and the need to develop a richer theory 
to enhance our understanding of the various IT compatibilities. Our findings also provide business 
insights to strategic planners and help them understand how and when to invest in IT product 
compatibilities to obtain positive reactions from investors.  
Keywords: Product Compatibility, Horizontal compatibility, Vertical Compatibility, Software, 
Hardware, Event study. 
 
1 Introduction 
The dynamics of the IT industry is very different from many other industries. In the presence of strong 
network effect, the user value of a product is treated as a function of stand-alone benefits and network 
externalities. Thus, the value to the consumer increases as the installed base (number of users in the 
network) of the product expands (e.g., Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002). Due to 
a high level of network effect in the IT industry, product compatibility is becoming increasingly 
important. For example, since the launch of Mac OS X Lion, many incompatibility issues have 
surfaced, resulting in a wave of compatibility initiatives by a number of firms. Furthermore, as the 
complexity level and the variety of IT products increase, firms as well as individuals are becoming 
more concerned with product compatibility issues when evaluating and adopting new products. At the 
industry level, IT firms’ strategic decisions about their products’ compatibilities often influence the 
competitive dynamics in the industry.  
Many prior studies have studied the effects of compatibility with respect to value addition to the 
customers (Katz and Shapiro, 1983) and how it can be seen as a strategic move of a firm to make its 
products compatible with other company’s product or the de facto standards. These studies have been 
primarily theoretical, often focusing on a specific type of products (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Kremer, 
1996) or a specific type of compatibility (e.g., Einhorn, 1992). Recognizing that there exists a great 
variety of IT products and previous research often identifies different types of compatibility (e.g., 
Chen and Forman, 2006; Katz and Shapiro, 1994), we conduct a study of compatibility initiatives 
associated with both horizontal compatibility and vertical compatibility as well as a range of IT 
products. 
Furthermore, we adopt a business value perspective in this research by examining the stock market’s 
reaction to IT firms’ compatibility initiatives. Given that firms make significant strategic investments 
in order to achieve compatibility with other products on the market, we are yet to understand the 
business value of these strategic moves toward compatibility. 
This study attempts to answer two research questions. First, what impact do firms’ strategic initiatives 
that strive to achieve compatibility with other products in the IT industry have on the stock market? 
Second, under what conditions do initiatives that strive to achieve compatibility with other products in 
the IT industry pay off in terms of abnormal stock returns? The results of this study not only provide a 
richer understanding of the nuances associated with IT product compatibility and the business value of 
IT compatibility initiatives but also offer practical implications to strategic planners who are making 
product compatibility decisions. 
2 Literature Review and Research Model 
2.1 Product compatibility 
Product compatibility refers to interoperability or the extent to which two or more products can work 
with one another. For example, Katz and Shapiro (1986) consider two units of hardware that can work 
with identical units of software to be compatible. Compatibility is made possible by coordinated 
product design and can be categorized into physical compatibility, communications compatibility, and 
compatibility by convention (Farrell and Saloner, 1987). The degree of compatibility between 
products is considered not only the result of a technological decision but also the result of a strategic 
decision by the firm (Besen and Farrell, 1994). 
Compatibility can be achieved in several ways. For products where the competing technologies are 
inherently incompatible, compatibility may be achieved through de facto standardization where all 
consumers adopt the same technology used by the market leader (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). 
Alternatively, products using different technologies may be designed in such a way that they have a 
standardized interface agreed upon by manufacturers and can work with one another, achieving 
technical compatibility (Farrell and Saloner, 1987; Katz and Shapiro, 1986). In addition, 
manufacturers may adopt open standards that are not set by any firm (Chen and Forman, 2006). 
Conversion technologies can also be used as an alternative mechanism to achieve compatibility (Liu et 
al., 2011).  
There has been a significant amount of research in economics and IS that examines incentives for 
achieving compatibility in an industry with network effects as well as the implications of achieving 
compatibility. One consumer obtains more value from a product when another consumer has a 
compatible product. In addition, compatibility among products may intensify price competition among 
vendors, leading to greater value obtained by consumers (Farrell and Saloner, 1985). Hence, when two 
firms’ products are compatible, the compatibility creates more value for consumers and draws more 
consumers into the market, increasing network size and further enhancing the value of firms’ products 
(Chen, Doraszelski, and Harrington 2009). Other benefits of compatibility include ease of 
communication and cost savings due to mass production of standardized parts when standards are 
adopted to achieve compatibility (Farrell and Saloner, 1986). Furthermore, firms with small user bases 
have strong incentives to make their products compatible with products of firms with larger user bases 
in a duopoly as well as markets with multiple firms and components (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; 
Economides 1989). However, some studies have argued that achieving compatibility with other firms’ 
products may not be desirable to firms with a large installed base because it may lose market share to 
other firms and be unable to demand higher prices for its products (Gandal, 1994; Brynjolfsson and 
Kemerer, 1996; Gallaugher and Wang, 2002).  
However, the studies summarized above are primarily theoretical with limited empirical support. In 
the recent years, a few empirical studies have been conducted to examine the impact of product 
compatibility. For example, Aggarwal et al. (2006) examine the financial market’s response to 
announcements of XML standardization initiatives and find that the market responds positively to 
announcements of proprietary standardization but not to those of open standardization. Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) study how the number of firms in standard-setting initiatives influences the participating firm’s 
return and risk including market risk and idiosyncratic risk. In the US cable modem market, Cohen-
Meidan (2007) investigates the influences of two standardization processes – one involving a 
commercial consortium and the other involving an official standardization organization – on both 
within standardization group competition and competition between standards. 
Based on the empirical findings of these studies, we hypothesize a positive impact of compatibility 
announcement on the firm’s abnormal stock returns. In the financial market, when a firm makes an 
announcement about its product compatibility with another firm’s product(s) or standards, rational and 
informed investors are likely to expect that this compatibility information will increase consumers’ 
welfare and positively influence the future revenues of the firm and its present value. Hence, under the 
efficient market hypothesis, such favorable expectations of the change in the firm’s value will likely 
lead to the firm’s positive abnormal stock returns. We hypothesize that 
Hypothesis 1: Involvement in product compatibility initiative results in positive abnormal stock 
returns for firms and its stock holders. 
2.2 Horizontal compatibility and vertical compatibility 
Depending on the relationship between two products that are compatible, previous research 
distinguishes between vertical compatibility and horizontal compatibility (e.g., Besen and Farrell, 
1994, Chen and Forman, 2006). 
Vertical compatibility refers to compatibility with complementary products from different 
manufacturers (e.g., Einhorn, 1992; Katz and Shapiro, 1994). An example of vertical compatibility is 
the support of the desktop PC operating system DOS and associated hardware platform IBM PC for 
complementary applications and peripheral devices, that was critical to the dominance of Win-Tel 
systems in the early PC market (Gandal, Greenstein and Salant, 1999). 
Given two firms produce two complementary components of a system, when these components are 
compatible, consumers can mix and match the firms’ components. In other words, they can obtain 
components from different firms and assemble their own systems. Thus, the number of different 
systems available to consumers is greater with vertical compatibility than without it. As a result, some 
consumers can obtain a system that better satisfies their need, shifting the industry demand curve 
upwards and increasing the market profitability (Matutes and Regibeau, 1988). A firm’s strategy with 
regard to its vertically related firms often focuses on increasing the supply of complementary products 
compatible with its own product while trying to discourage such a supply to its competitors (Besen 
and Farrell, 1994). In addition, vertical compatibility between two firms’ components increases the 
components’ prices and the firms’ profits (Einhorn, 1992). Furthermore, a virtual network effect arises 
when an increasing number of adopters of a focal product increase the demand for compatible 
complementary products and the variety of such products. Such an increase in the availability of the 
variety of complementary products increases the benefit of all adopters of the focal product (Gandal, 
2002). The consumers who purchase the focal product and the compatible complementary products 
form a virtual network. When the focal product is compatible with a greater number of 
complementary products, the virtual network size and virtual network benefit increase. 
Horizontal compatibility refers to compatibility with competitors’ comparable products (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1994) that are functionally equivalent. An example of horizontal compatibility is the 
interoperability between two routers (Chen and Forman, 2006).  
Given two firms producing comparable products in a market with network externalities, making their 
products compatible has several implications. First, the network size will likely increase because 
additional consumers who do not want to be locked in to a single product may be attracted to the 
network due to the compatibility between the two products. Secondly, the increase in the market size 
may also lead to the investor’s favorable assessment of the firms’ future value due to indirect network 
effect, which arises when a bigger market increases the demand for and the supply of complementary 
products (Gandal, 2002). Thirdly, as pointed out by Besen and Farrell (1994), in the long run, the co-
existence of incompatible products on the market may be unstable and eventually a single winning 
standard will dominate the market. When the investor perceives the increased market size as a result of 
the horizontal compatibility announcement, the investor may also perceive an increased likelihood that 
these products will emerge as the de facto standard in the future, leading to favorable expectations 
about the impact of the announcement on the firm’s value. 
However, horizontal compatibility may intensify the competition between the comparable products. 
When horizontal compatibility with rivals’ products is present, competition between the products may 
be channeled into other dimensions such as price, service, and product features (Bensen and Farrell, 
1994). In other words, vendors may need to make strategic enhancement to their products to increase 
product differentiation, improve product functionality, or to improve customer service in order to 
acquire new customers and retain existing customers (Chen and Forman, 2006). Hence, when 
competitors’ products are made compatible, the competition may intensify but the specific impact of 
such competition on each firm may not be clear to investors. If the firm is able to successfully 
distinguish its product in price, service, or features, the impact of horizontal compatibility may be 
positive. But if the firm is unable to do so, it may suffer from achieving horizontal compatibility with 
its rivals’ products. 
In summary, on one hand, both horizontal compatibility and vertical compatibility tend to increase the 
market size but in different ways. The additional consumers attracted by compatible complementary 
products tend to be those who would like to mix and match the components produced by different 
firms. The additional customers attracted by compatible comparable products tend to be those who 
perceive the products to be more valuable because of the anticipated larger user base, the perceived 
increased availability of complementary products, and the perceived emergence of de facto standard 
from these products. Hence, we hypothesize the positive effect of horizontal compatibility as 
Hypothesis 2a : Companies obtain higher abnormal stock returns from a horizontal product 
compatibility announcement in comparison to a vertical product compatibility announcement.    
On the other hand, horizontal compatibility may intensify the competition between the comparable 
products because firms may need to increase product differentiation, improve product functionality, 
and provide value to customers in such a way that helps acquire and retain customers (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999). In contrast, vertical compatibility is unlikely to alter the intensity of the competition 
between the firms. When horizontal compatibility intensifies the market competition to such an extent 
that a firm’s customer base decreases despite the increase in the overall market size for all firms 
producing comparable products, this firm may be perceived less favorably by the investors than a firm 
announcing a vertical product compatibility. Therefore, we propose the following competing 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b:  Companies obtain higher abnormal stock returns from a vertical product 
compatibility announcement in comparison to horizontal product compatibility announcement.    
2.3 Software compatibility and hardware compatibility 
In addition, we argue that the impact of product compatibility announcements is different for software 
products and hardware products. The cost of achieving software compatibility is likely lower than that 
of achieving hardware compatibility. As information goods, software is costly to produce but can be 
reproduced with low marginal cost. To make existing software compatible with other products, the 
firm needs to invest resources in modifying the existing code but does not need to invest in additional 
equipment and materials. And the existing customers can install software patches to obtain the newly 
implemented compatibility benefits. In contrast, to make existing hardware products compatible with 
other products, the firm incurs greater cost (both fixed cost and marginal cost) in modifying the 
design, manufacturing, and assembling the modified products. In addition, hardware producers face 
the possibility that the earlier models of the product may become obsolete once the newer, compatible 
model is made available to customers, leading to lost revenue and additional inventory cost. From the 
customer’s perspective, unlike software upgrade that can be achieved by patch installations, hardware 
upgrade often requires the customer to replace the existing product with the new one. Consequently, 
we posit that achieving software compatibility for existing software products is less costly and risky 
than achieving hardware compatibility and that shareholders may perceive achieving software 
compatibility more favorably than hardware compatibility. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis H3: Companies obtain higher abnormal stock returns from announcing software product 
compatibility than from announcing hardware product compatibility. 
3 Research Method 
A common method to estimate the stock market reaction to news announcements is through event 
studies which evaluates the signs and significance of the abnormal returns following the news 
announcements. 
Event studies are based on the assumptions that capital markets operate efficiently and that all 
information available to the market can be incorporated into the stock price. Consequently, as new 
information is provided to the market in the form of a firm’s announcements about its strategies, 
operations, and performances, the market should quickly incorporate the new information into the 
firm’s stock price. The event study method has been widely adopted to examine the impact of business 
events on shareholder value and risks. IS researchers have also examined abnormal returns on stock 
prices and short-term changes in market value caused by IT related events such as e-commerce 
announcements (e.g., Subramani and Walden, 2001; Dewan and Ren, 2007), announcements of 
transformational IT investments (Dehning, et al., 2003), announcements of CIO positions and hires 
(Chatterjee, Richardson and Zmud, 2001), BPO announcements (Duan et al., 2009) etc. Konchitchki 
and O’Leary (2011) provide a review of event studies in information systems discipline. 
The event of interest in this study is the announcement of a product compatibility initiative of a firm. 
An important assumption of the event-study methodology assumes that the information contained in 
the compatibility initiative announcements is not anticipated by the market beforehand. We expect the 
market to revalue the firm based on the information conveyed in the news announcement (e.g., Dos 
Santosh et al., 1993; MacKinley, 1997; Aggarwal et al. 2006). Abnormal return is defined as the 
difference between actual return of the stock and the expected "normal" return based on the so-called 
market model, which relates stock returns Rit to the returns on the market portfolio Rmt as follows: 
rit = αi +  βi rmt + εit  (1) 
where i and t index the firm and date of returns relative to event respectively. This model is estimated 
over an estimation window usually 120 days or more prior to the event. The abnormal return on stock 
for the firm i for each day in the event window (T1, T2) is given by the difference between the actual 
ex post return and the predicted return from the market model, 
ARit = rit - (αi +  βi rmt)  for t ε [T1, T2] (2) 
where αi and βi are the parameter estimates from model 1. The daily excess return over the event 
window was cumulated to get Cumulative abnormal return (CAR). Using the variance of CAR, the 
cumulative returns over the event window can be standardized to obtain Standardized Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (SCAR) to smooth out any stock specific variations in the cumulative abnormal 
returns.  
3.1 Data collection 
Adopting the method that is used in past event studies (e.g. Dehning et al., 2003; Aggarwal et al. 2006; 
Dewan and Ren, 2007; Aggarwal et al. 2011), we collected news releases or public announcements 
about product compatibility by searching LexisNexis Academic Universe database. Our search used 
the combination of the following keywords: enhance or obtain or achieve or improve or gain or 
increase, product, and compatible or interoperable. For the period from year 2001 to year 2003, we 
identified 233 announcements that were made by publicly traded companies containing the specified 
key words. The period is suitable for study as it is the period after the software boom and avoids 
confounding effcets from that period. In addition, new product announcements where compatibility is 
one of the several features were excluded from the sample to avoid potential confounding effects. 
Announcements that did not mention a specific product including announcements involving 
development of a new standard were excluded. To avoid confounding effects due to other events like 
mergers and acquisitions, earning announcements or changes in the board of directors in the period of 
2 days before the focal event to the event day we removed such announcements. We included only the 
publicly traded US firms and excluded private firms in the analysis due lack of availability of required 
data. The returns data was collected from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) database In 
accordance with prior studies (Aggarwal et. al., 2011; Dewan and Ren, 2007).  We collected the data 
for 180 calendar days before and after the event, which would be equivalent to about 120 trading days. 
We also excluded firms with an average trading price of less than $1 or with less than 60 trading days 
of data before or after the event date. After removing duplicates and observations that have missing 
stock or financial data, we obtained 184 observations. 
For these observations, two authors performed a content analysis to identify the type of compatibility 
(horizontal vs. vertical) and the type of product in the announcement (software vs. hardware). 14 
observations were droppped because the announcements either did not clearly specify the type of 
compatibility or the type of product, or contained more than one type of compatibility. Table 1 shows 
an example of news announcement in our sample. 
 Business Wire 
 
April 5, 2001, Thursday 
Quantum|ATL Certifies the Emulex LP8000S SBus HBA With its Fibre Channel-Based 
Network Storage Solutions 
 
DATELINE: IRVINE & COSTA MESA, Calif., April 5, 2001 
BODY: Certification Assures Complete Interoperability of Best-in-Class Network Storage 
Products for Increased Availability and Manageability of Open SAN Systems 
 
Quantum|ATL, a unit of Quantum's DLT and Storage Systems Group (NYSE:DSS) and a leading 
supplier of intelligent DLTtape(TM) automation products for networked computers, and Emulex 
Corporation (Nasdaq:EMLX), the world's leading supplier of storage networking host bus adapters 
(HBAs), today announced that the Emulex LightPulse(R) LP8000S SBus Fibre Channel (FC) HBA 
has been awarded certification of interoperability with Quantum|ATL's SAN solution offerings for 
Sun Solaris environments. Certification of the Emulex LP8000S provides customers with the 
assurance that this product is not only compatible with Quantum|ATL's P1000, P2000 and P3000 
Series FC tape libraries, but also will perform with Quantum|ATL-certified solutions in a SAN 
environment. 
 
"Our certification process consists of rigorous laboratory testing of the product in a Quantum|ATL 
SAN environment. The Emulex LP8000S SBus host bus adapter demonstrated the performance and 
reliability demanded by our mutual customers," said Richard Toomey, technical marketing SAN 
engineer, Quantum|ATL. "With this announcement, our SAN customers can now choose both PCI 
and SBus host bus adapters from Emulex with full confidence of interoperability with our SAN 
solutions."  
 
Among the powerful benefits provided by the Emulex LP8000S is the HBA's support of device 
scanning at boot prompt and firmware updated with the driver load during system start-up. 
Additionally, the card supports BINDINGS, which enables it to maintain system level operation 
through SAN channels. The LP8000S is certified for use in Solaris 2.6 and 2.8 environments. 
 
"Our LP8000S leverages the feature rich architecture of our market-leading LP8000 PCI products, 
so customers may now enjoy the same robust performance and reliability in both PCI and Sun 
SBus environments running Solaris. Our LightPulse family of HBAs provide a unique combination 
of features required for mission-critical enterprise applications, including full fabric support, high 
data integrity, full-duplex operation, data buffering for up to 100km of cabling, and support for all 
Fibre Channel topologies," stated Mike Smith, executive vice president of Worldwide Marketing at 
Emulex. "Quantum|ATL's certification of our new SBus HBA provides significant benefits to our 
mutual customers who require robust, interoperable solutions." 
 
Emulex host bus adapters are also supported by a rich suite of software for storage protocol (SCSI), 
network protocol (IP), as well as multi-protocol (SCSI and IP) operation, which makes them a 
perfect solution for Quantum|ATL's advanced SAN and network applications. Emulex also 
provides a wide range of operating system support, including Windows NT and 2000, Solaris, AIX, 
Linux, HP-UX, and NetWare. 
Table 1.  An Example of Compatibility Announcement 
3.2 Analysis 
Hypothesis testing was carried out using the typical event study model following previous studies 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Subramani and Walden, 2001; Duan et. al., 2009). We used three day event 
window in accordance with prior event studies (Aggarwal et. al. 2011, Dewan and Ren, 2007). We 
used CRSP equally weighted index for market returns and obtained individual firms’ market adjusted 
returns. We aggregated the ARs over the three day event window to get the CAR for 3 days and as 
suggested by prior studies, standardized the CAR to get the standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
(SCAR), over the 3- day window as suggested by Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). To test H1, 
we calculated the z-statistic for the standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) of the portfolio 
of N=170 observations. 
To test the hypotheses H2 and H3, we conducted independent sample t-test with SCAR as the test 
variable and Horizontal (=1 for horizontal compatibility; =0 for vertical compatibility) or Software (= 
1 for software product; =1 for hardware product). The parametric tests indicated above are limited by 
the assumptions about the distribution of the abnormal returns. To overcome these limitations and 
ensure robustness of results, prior research (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) has suggested using non-
parametric tests. To supplement our results we run Wilcoxon-Rank-sum test and regression with 
additional control variables. 
4 Results 
The distribution of the observations is summarized in Table 2. The descriptive statistics including 
mean, standard deviation, median and the quartile ranges of abnormal returns viz. AR (-1), AR (0), 
AR (+1) for each day in the event window, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over the event 
window and, standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR) over the 3-day event window are 
shown in Table 3. As indicated, a firm receives 0.77% abnormal return over a 3-day window by 
announcing a compatibility initiative, while average event day abnormal return is 1.08%. 
 
    2001 2002 2003 Total 
Compatibility Type 
  
  
Horizontal compatibility 26 6 8 40 (23.53%) 
Vertical Compatibility 68 26 36 130 (76.47%) 
Total 94 32 44 170 (100%) 
Product Type  
  
  
Software 50 18 24 92 (54.12%) 
Hardware 44 14 20 78 (45.88%) 
Total 94 48 66 170 (100%) 
Table 2.  Distribution of Event Sample 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Maximum 
AR (-1) -0.0041 0.0409 -0.1055 -0.0318 -0.0045 0.0173 0.1679 
AR (0) 0.0108 0.0519 -0.1207 -0.0190 0.0040 0.0355 0.2264 
AR (+1) 0.0010 0.0494 -0.1937 -0.0245 0.0003 0.0199 0.1925 
CAR 0.0077 0.0808 -0.2557 -0.0425 -0.0029 0.0476 0.3034 
SCAR 0.0739 0.9106 -2.3119 -0.5102 -0.0353 0.6539 3.5509 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics for Abnormal Returns 
 
Table 4 shows that, out of 170 announcements, 40 are related to horizontal compatibility and 130 are 
related to vertical compatibility while 92 are related to software products and 78 are related to 
hardware products. Table 4 also summarizes the results of hypothesis testing as discussed below. 
 
Hypothesis Sample Size SCAR Mean 
Parametric tests (one-tailed 
t-tests 
Non-parametric tests 
(Wilcoxon rank sum test) 
Statistics Significance  Statistics  Significance  
H1  Total 170 0.0739 0.9629 0.1678 (z-test)   
  
H2 
Horizontal 40 0.3700 2.3848 0.0091 1.99 0.0233 
Vertical 130 -0.0173   
 
    
H3 
Software 92 0.1691 1.4858 0.0696 1.52 0.0643 
Hardware 78 -0.0384         
Table 4.  Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns and Hypothesis Testing Results 
 
The first hypothesis H1 relates to the overall effect of compatibility announcements to yield positive 
abnormal returns. The z-statistic in Table 3 is not significant. Thus we found no support for overall 
positive impact of a product compatibility announcement on the firm’s valuation as suggested by H1. 
Mean value of SCAR for horizontal compatibility is 0.3700 while the mean SCAR for vertical 
compatibility is -0.0173. The difference of mean yields a t-statistic of 2.3848, which is significant with 
one-tailed test at 95 % confidence level (p=0.009). Multiple regression analysis controlling for size of 
the firm and year of the announcement, yields a standardized coefficient of 0.181 for the dummy 
variable horizontal, which is significant at 95% confidence level (p=0.019). Non-parametric test 
Wilcoxon rank sum test yields a z-score of 1.99, which is significant at 95% confidence level 
(p=0.023). As a result, we find support for H2a. Thus firms obtain higher positive abnormal stock 
returns from a horizontal product compatibility announcement in comparison to comparison product 
compatibility announcement.    
Similarly to test H3, we conducted an independent sample t-test on SCAR as test variable by 
regrouping it by dummy variable software. Mean value of SCAR for software announcements was 
0.1691 and mean SCAR for hardware announcements was -0.0384. The t-statistic of the mean 
difference is 1.4858, which is significant at 90% confidence level (p=0.0696). Regression analysis 
controlling for the size of the firm and year of announcement yielded a standard coefficient of 0.130 
which is significant at 90% confidence level (p= 0.090). Wilcoxon rank sum test Z-score was 1.52, 
significant at 90% confidence (p=0.0696). This gives a weak support to H3.  
5 Discussion and Conclusion 
Overall, the results suggest that the chances of getting a positive or negative abnormal return from the 
stock market as a reaction to a product compatibility announcement depends upon the type of the 
compatibility achieved and the type of products involved. We find that investors tend to respond 
positively to a horizontal compatibility initiative rather than a vertical compatibility initiative. In 
addition, the financial market seems to respond to software product compatibility announcements 
more positively than hardware product compatibility initiatives. 
Although a rich body of theoretical research on network effects identifies and analyzes the incentives 
for achieving product compatibility and the impacts of product compatibility on market competition, 
firm value, and social welfare, there has been a scarcity of empirical studies on the business value of 
strategic decisions related to product compatibility. Different from two event studies (Aggarwal et al. 
2006 and Aggarwal et al. 2011) that focus on stock market’s reaction to standardization initiatives, 
which represent one of several means to achieve product compatibility, we investigate the business 
value of IT product compatibility initiatives in general. Theoretically, through comparing the effects of 
product compatibility initiatives across types of compatibility and across product types, we extend the 
network externality research by contextualizing it to the IT industry. Our findings reveal the nuances 
in this context that have been largely ignored in the existing theoretical research on network effects. 
We identify the need to further develop richer theories that emphasizes the differential impact of 
different types of IT product compatibility on different IT products. 
From a managerial perspective, the findings provide some insights that can help firms’ strategic 
planners identify how and when to invest in IT product compatibility in order to obtain a positive 
market reaction to their compatibility strategies. 
As it is with most of the event studies, this study considers only the publicly traded firms in the United 
States because of the constraints on availability of the data. Another limitation is associated with our 
sampling time period. Although the authors feel that the announcements were comparable over the 
years, future research may look into the issue with more recent data and compare and contrast the 
findings over the years. In addition, future research may examine the possible interaction effects 
between compatibility types and firm size or compare them across different industries. Overall, this 
study has the potential to contribute to the literature on compatibility and network effects by 
expanding our examination of the effects of different compatibility types and developing a richer 
theory about product compatibility. 
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